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That objective reference is necessary for formation of reliable beliefs about the external world is almost
axiomatic. However, Condorcet (1785) suggested that purely subjective information—if shared and combined
via social interaction—is enough for accurate understanding of the external world. We asked if social
interaction and objective reference contribute differently to the formation and build-up of collective perceptual
beliefs. In three experiments, dyads made individual and collective perceptual decisions in a two-interval,
forced-choice, visual search task. In Experiment 1, participants negotiated their collective decisions with each
other verbally and received feedback about accuracy at the end of each trial. In Experiment 2, feedback was
not given. In Experiment 3, communication was not allowed but feedback was provided. Social interaction
(Experiments 1 and 2 vs. 3) resulted in a significant collective benefit in perceptual decisions. When feedback
was not available a collective benefit was not initially obtained but emerged through practice to the extent that
in the second half of the experiments, collective benefits obtained with (Experiment 1) and without (Exper-
iment 2) feedback were robust and statistically indistinguishable. Taken together, this work demonstrates that
social interaction was necessary for build-up of reliable collaborative benefit, whereas objective reference only
accelerated the process but—given enough opportunity for practice—was not necessary for building up
successful cooperation.
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In the story of “The Elephant in the Dark”, the medieval
Farsi-speaking poet Rumi masterfully portrayed the limitations
places on beliefs by noisy sensory perception (Tourage, 2007).
Late one evening, an Indian circus arrived at a village. The more
curious villagers sneaked into the elephant’s stable. In absolute
darkness, they made observations by touching the elephant’s body.
When they returned to their families, their accounts, constrained
by their limited sensory experiences, gave widely divergent images
of the elephant. Rumi concluded that “light” —an external source
of objective reference—is necessary for formation of reliable be-
liefs about the external world. Without objective reference, beliefs
will be purely subjective.
Here we test this notion empirically against the hypothesis that,
if individual observers without objective reference, such as Rumi’s
villagers, have the opportunity to share their experiences through
repeated social interaction, they could ultimately achieve as accu-
rate beliefs as with objective reference. We borrow this approach
from the Marquis de Condorcet (1785), an Enlightenment mathe-
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and combining purely subjective information via social interaction,
humans could construct reliable beliefs about the external world.
Previous research on collective decision making (Henry, Strick-
land, Yorges, & Ladd, 1996) suggests that access to feedback (i.e.,
objective reference) enables groups to evaluate the reliability of
individual members more effectively. However, even with feed-
back, groups of interacting individuals seems unable to exceed
their best individuals in tasks involving general knowledge, orga-
nizational management skills (Tindale, 1989), and jury decision
tasks (Hastie & Kameda, 2005). However, recent evidence sug-
gests that interacting groups can achieve a reliable collective
benefit over and above their best individuals in a perceptual task
(Bahrami et al., 2010), even in the absence of feedback, thus
supporting Condorcet’s view.
Collective endeavor needs coordination and mutual understand-
ing, which often takes time, effort, and experience to establish.
Previous research reviewed above has placed little emphasis on the
role of experience and learning in cooperation. Here we tested the
role of social interaction and feedback on the build-up of effective
collective perceptual decision making.
Methods
Participants
Seventy-two adult healthy male participants with normal or
corrected-to-normal vision were recruited in Aarhus, Denmark,
plus an additional eight participants in London, U.K. (Experiment
1[ N  22], mean age  standard deviation [SD]: 28.30  6.27;
Experiment 2 [N  30], mean age  SD: 26.30  5.3; and
Experiment 3 [N  28]), mean age  SD: 27.30  6.1). Members
of each dyad knew each other. No participant was recruited for
more than one experiment. All experiments were approved by the
local ethics committee.
Stimulus, Task Design, and Procedure
Sitting in the same room, each participant faced his own screen
(Figure 1B), placed at right angles to the other. The two displays
Figure 1. (A) Sequential schema of events in Experiments 1–3. Each trial started with two stimulus intervals. Visual
stimuli consisted of six vertically oriented Gabor patches that were displayed equidistantly around an imaginary circle.
One (randomly selected) interval contained the target (here indicated by the dashed circle) of higher contrast.
Participants then indicated their individual decisions privately. If they disagreed, in Experiments 1 and 2 participants
negotiated a joint decision; in Experiment 3, one (randomly assigned) participant made a joint decision on behalf of
the group without any interaction. Feedback about accuracy was provided in Experiments 1 and 3 but not in
Experiment 2. (B) Testing setup. (C) Group average psychometric functions relating the individual and group choice
to stimulus strength in Experiment 1. The X axis shows the contrast difference at the oddball location (i.e., contrast
in the second interval minus contrast in the first). The Y axis shows the proportion of trials in which the target was
reported to be in the second interval. Circles: average performance of the less sensitive dyad members; squares:
average performance of the more sensitive dyad members; diamonds: average performance of the dyads. The curves
are the best fit to a cumulative Gaussian function.
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viewing distance  57 cm, output luminance linearized, back-
ground luminance 62.5 Cd/m
2) were connected to the same com-
puter controlled by Cogent (http://www.vislab.ucl.ac.uk/
cogent.php) for MATLAB (Mathworks Inc). Within each
experimental session, one participant responded with the keyboard
and the other with the mouse.
In every trial (Figure 1A), participants viewed a visual search
array containing a contrast-defined target plus five distracters in a
two-interval forced-choice design. Each trial was initiated by one
participant. After an initial central fixation cross (width: 0.75
degrees; random duration, range 500–1000 ms), the two stimulus
intervals (duration: 85 ms; separated by a blank screen—duration:
1000 ms) ensued. The stimulus set (Figure 1A) comprised six
vertically oriented Gabor patches (standard deviation of the Gauss-
ian envelope: 0.45 degrees; spatial frequency: 1.5 cycles/degree;
nontarget contrast: 10%) equally spaced on a circle (eccentricity: 8
degrees). Target contrast was 1.5%, 3.5%, 7.0%, or 15% higher
than the nontarget pedestal. Target location, contrast, and interval
were randomized across trials. A central question mark was dis-
played after the second interval and remained until both partici-
pants had responded.
Participants first made private individual decisions about the
target interval, which were then displayed publicly (Figure 1A)
using color codes to distinguish keyboard (blue) and mouse (yel-
low) responses. If private decisions disagreed, a joint decision was
requested. The keyboard participant announced the joint decision
in odd trials; the mouse participant in even trials. In Experiments
1–2, participants negotiated this joint decision through communi-
cation. In Experiment 3, one of the two participants arbitrated for
the dyad without communicating with the other; participants were
instructed not to talk, wore earphones to eliminate auditory com-
munication via unintentional utterances and were separated by a
cardboard screen. The experimenter was present throughout testing
to ensure instructions were observed.
In Experiments 1 and 3, participants received feedback about
outcomes (“CORRECT” or “WRONG”), one for each participant
(keyboard: blue; mouse: yellow) and one for the dyad (white).
After one practice block of 16 trials, two main experimental
sessions were conducted. Each main session consisted of eight
blocks of 16 trials. Participants switched places (and thereby
screen and response device) at the end of Session 1.
Analysis
To quantify perceptual sensitivity, the slope of the psychometric
function relating target contrast to choice was estimated (Figure
1C) for individuals (Figure 1C, dashed lines) and dyad (Figure 1C,
solid line) separately. A cumulative Gaussian function with pa-
rameters bias, b, and variance, 
2 was fitted to each obtained
psychometric function by a probit regression model employing the
glmfit function in MATLAB (Mathworks Inc). A participant with
bias b and variance 
2 would have a psychometric curve, denoted
P(c) where c is the contrast difference between the second and














Here, the psychometric curve, P(c), corresponds to the prob-
ability of saying that target was in the second interval. Given this
definitions for P(c), the variance is related to the maximum slope






This slope parameter quantifies the perceptual sensitivity. The
collective benefit over and above the individual dyad members
was defined as the ratio of the dyad slope to that of the more
sensitive dyad member.
Sliding Window Analysis
To investigate the development of collective-decision mak-
ing, we performed a sliding window analysis (see Figure 3). For
each dyad, the first window of selection sampled the Trials
1–80. Psychometric functions were estimated for the individu-
als and dyad and collective benefit was determined for the
sampled trials. The window was then slid by one step to sample
the Trials 8–87. This process was repeated until the sliding
window reached the last 80 trials (176–256). We used this
approach rather than splitting the data into small but nonover-
lapping blocks because constructing and estimating reliable
psychometric functions requires a large number of trials.
Results
Qualitative Observations
Participants in Experiment 1–2 were encouraged to discuss and
try any useful strategy. Some groups split the task spatially (e.g.,
upper and lower half) or temporally (first and second intervals).
However, such strategies were never sustained. Participants invari-
ably preferred attending to both intervals in all locations.
Dyad conversations focused on participants’ confidence in their
decisions. However, only one group among the 30 interacting
dyads (Experiments 1–2) spontaneously used an explicit numerical
scale to express and compare confidence. All other groups used
more everyday expressions such as “I was not so sure” and “I saw
it clearly.” On a trial-by-trial basis, participants tended to align to
each other’s confidence expressions (e.g., if one person initiated
with “I did not see anything,” their partner was likely to respond
with an expression involving “see”). In general, the content of
conversations tended to diminish with practice. Participants con-
verged to a small set of expressions toward the end of the exper-
iment. A more detailed linguistic analysis of these aspects of the
interactive confidence sharing process is work in progress (Fusa-
roli et al., submitted).
Quantitative Results
Social interaction enabled the groups to exceed their best
performing members. A mixed 3  2 analysis of variance
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function) with experiment as between-subject factor with three
levels and decision maker as within-subject factor with two
levels (better individual vs. dyad, Figure 2) showed a signifi-
cant main effect for decision maker, F(1, 41)  26.16; p 
0.0001, but not for experiment, F(2, 41)  1.8; p  0.17.
Importantly, there was a significant interaction between deci-
sion maker and experiment, F(2, 41)  7.38; p  .002. Post hoc
comparisons showed that dyads outperformed the more sensi-
tive member of the group in Experiments 1, t(14)  5.2; p 
.0001; paired t test and 2 t(14)  3.85, p  .002; paired t test,
but not in Experiment 3, t(14)  0.01; p  .9; paired t test.
These data showed clearly that social interaction was necessary
for achieving a collective benefit and that this benefit was
statistically identical with and without feedback (i.e., objective
reference). They do not, however, identify the role of social
interaction and feedback in the build-up of collective perceptual
decision making.
The sliding window analysis (see Figure 3) indicated that with
feedback, collective benefit was fairly stable across time both
when communication was (Experiment 1, black squares) and was
not (Experiment 3, dark gray triangles) allowed. Without feedback,
a different pattern was observed (Experiment 2, light gray circles):
little collective benefit was initially achieved in the first 1/3 of the
experiment. However, a rising trend emerged leading to a consis-
tent collective benefit in the latter 2/3 of the experiment. In the
final third of the trials, interactive groups achieved similar levels of
collective benefit irrespective of feedback.
In order to statistically qualify these observations, we em-
ployed a mixed 3  2 ANOVA (experiment: between-group
factor with three levels; session: within-group factor with two
levels; see Figure 4) with collective benefit as the dependent
variable. This showed a significant main effect of session, F(1,
41)  6.75, p  .013 and experiment, F(2, 41)  7.20, p 
.002, and a significant interaction between session and experi-
ment, F(2, 41)  4.98, p  .012. With feedback (Figure 4,
black line), dyads achieved consistent and significant collective
benefit in both experimental sessions, (one-sample t test com-
paring each data point to the horizontal “no benefit” line y  1,
for Session 1, t(14)  2.72, p  .016; for Session 2, t(14) 
5.29, p  .001), with no significant difference between ses-
sions, (paired t test, t(14)  1.13, p  .25). Without feedback
(Figure 4, gray dashed line), significant collective benefit was
only achieved in the second session, (one-sample t test, for
Session 1, t(14)  0.7, p  .5; for Session 2, t(14)  5.6, p 
.001), and a remarkable impact of social interaction over time
was demonstrated by a highly significant difference between
the two sessions, paired t test, t(14)  4.5, p  .001. Finally,
without social interaction (Figure 4; gray dotted line), access to
feedback did not produce any benefit in either session (p.6 for both
sessions; one-sample t test comparing to 1) and there was no evidence
Figure 2. Average sensitivity (i.e., the slope of the psychometric func-
tion—see Figure 1C) is plotted for the best performing member of each
group (Smax) and the dyads (Sdyad). Interacting dyads (Experiments 1 and
2) exceeded their own best performing individual. Without interaction,
providing feedback (Experiment 3) did not afford any group benefit.
Figure 3. Sliding window analysis shows that collective benefit was
gradually accumulated in the absence of feedback. Collective benefit (Y
axis) is plotted against the trial number at the center of the sampling
window. Error bars represent one standard error of the mean.
Figure 4. Average collective benefit accrued from joint decision making
is plotted for the two sessions of the experiments. Error bars represent one
standard error of the mean.
6 BAHRAMI, OLSEN, BANG, ROEPSTORFF, REES, AND FRITHfor any improvement in collective benefit over time (p  .5 paired t
test).
Discussion
Our results showed that social interaction resulted in significant
collective benefit in perceptual decisions. When feedback was not
available, collective benefit was not initially obtained but emerged
through practice, so that in the second half of the experimental run,
collective benefits obtained with and without feedback were sta-
tistically indistinguishable. With feedback, communicating dyads
achieved a robust collective benefit from the beginning of the first
session. Thus, the role of objective reference may be to accelerate
the process of belief formation at the group level.
Our results reject Rumi’s notion that objective reference is
indispensible for forming reliable beliefs about the external world.
Instead, they support Condorcet’s (1785) view that sharing and
combining purely subjective information via social interaction is
sufficient for forming reliable beliefs—that is to say, sufficient
given adequate opportunity for practice.
Perceptual decision making in isolated individuals is en-
hanced by feedback (Herzog & Fahle, 1997; Herzog & Fahle,
1999; Seitz, Kim, & Watanabe, 2009), even when feedback is
motivationally relevant but informationally void (Shibata,
Yamagishi, Ishii, & Kawato, 2009). Similar but smaller im-
provements are also observed without feedback (Ball &
Sekuler, 1987; Poggio, Fahle, & Edellman, 1992) indicating
that feedback is not always necessary for perceptual learning.
Feedback also plays a crucial role in nonperceptual collective
decision-making. As discussed earlier, several studies have
shown that feedback is necessary for improving collective de-
cision accuracy (Henry, Strickland, Yorges, & Ladd, 1996;
Tindale, 1989; Hastie & Kameda, 2005). Our work goes beyond
this to examine the impact of social interaction and feedback on
the development of collective perceptual decision making. Our
findings raise a number of issues for future research.
What are the computational characteristics of learning in
collective belief formation? One computational model (Bah-
rami et al., 2010) proposes that collective beliefs are con-
structed via “confidence sharing,” where confidence is the
observer’s subjective estimate of probability of being correct on
a particular trial. Importantly, this model does not include any
role for social learning and instead assumes that the impact of
practice is negligible. Although the data presented here show
that this assumption is reasonable when feedback is provided,
this model is not consistent with the findings from the “no
feedback” experiment. Future research should seek to explain
the construction of effective collective behavior over the course
of repeated interactions in the absence of feedback. Several
recent computational models have been proposed for social
interaction based on principles of associative reinforcement
learning (Behrens, Hunt, Woolrich, & Rushworth, 2008; Beh-
rens, Hunt, & Rushworth, 2009; Hampton, Bossaerts, &
O’Doherty, 2008). But it is difficult to see how these models
can account for what seems to be unsupervised social learning
(i.e., without any explicit reinforcement or feedback).
One appealing conjecture is that exchanging subjective confi-
dence (individuals’ metacognitive awareness of their perceptual
decisions), could replace feedback and reinforce social learning. In
this view, metacognition provides an imperfect and noisy but
informative estimate of the true state of the world (i.e., decision
outcomes) when the outcome is not readily available. The learning
process therefore takes longer to develop without feedback but
given enough practice, leads to as much collective benefit as with
feedback. As such, we speculate that a functional role of metacog-
nitive awareness may be to replace missing reinforcement when
decision outcomes are not available. Communication and confi-
dence sharing afford access to two, rather than one reinforcement
signal eventually leading to collective benefit.
Metacognitive accuracy varies across individuals and such vari-
ability has been correlated with gray matter volume in anterior
medial prefrontal cortex (Fleming, Weil, Nagy, Dolan, & Rees,
2010). Our conjecture thus predicts that social collective learning
without feedback should be quicker and more successful in indi-
viduals with better metacognition and thus with larger gray matter
volume in anterior medial prefrontal cortex.
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Correction to Potter et al. (2011)
The article “Attention Blinks for Selection, Not Perception or Memory: Reading Sentences and
Reporting Targets,” by Mary C. Potter, Brad Wyble, and Jennifer Olejarczyk (Journal of Experi-
mental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 2011, Vol. 37, No. 6, pp. 1915–1923)
contained several production-related errors.




Examples of a Sentence in Each Experiment
Experiment 1: Our tabby cat chased
a a mouse all around the backyard
Experiment 2: Our tabby cat CHASED a MOUSE all around the backyard
Experiment 3: Our 6666 tabby cat 2222 chased a mouse all around the backyard
Experiment 4: Our six tabby cat two chased a mouse all around the backyard
Note. Just one lag condition is illustrated; see text for the lag and serial positions in each experiment.
a The critical words in Experiment 1 were red but in the same font as the other words; here they are shown in
bold.
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